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1LEGAL LINES IN SHIFTING SAND:
IMMIGRATION LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11TH
Daniel Kanstroom*
Abstract: In March of 2004, a group of legal scholars gathered at Boston
College Law School to examine the doctrinal implications of the events of
September 11, 2001. They reconsidered the lines drawn between citizens
and noncitizens, war and peace, the civil and criminal systems, as well as
the U.S. territorial line. Participants responded to the proposition that
certain entrenched historical matrices no longer adequately answer the
complex questions raised in the “war on terror.” They examined the
importance of government disclosure and the public’s right to know; the
deportation system’s habeas corpus practices; racial proªling; the conver-
gence of immigration and criminal law since the attacks; judicial review of
military detentions at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere; and noncitizens’
rights in the United States and the European Union. From their insights
have emerged an outline for future research and the seeds of a pragmatic
legal approach to these increasingly complex questions, all grounded in a
deep respect for human rights.
The truism that we never forget where we were and what we were
doing at the time of world-shaking events can be misleading. My
memory of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for exam-
ple, is highly personal and more emotional than rational: my mother’s
tears, the seething, unfocused tension between children of different
races in my urban school the next morning, and my teacher’s well-
intentioned but inept attempts to help us grasp how we as a society
had succumbed to the terrible veto of violence.
I do, however, remember exactly where I was and what I was do-
ing when the planes hit the buildings in New York. The details remain
clear not only because I am now an adult, but also because for me the
whole episode was marked by a poignant combination of tragedy, fear,
and—astonishingly—a kind of epiphany.
I was teaching immigration law that semester at Boston College
Law School. Two weeks before September 11, my class and I had read
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and discussed the several late nineteenth century cases that form the
foundation of what is known as the “plenary power doctrine.” We had
struggled to conceptualize and articulate the limits of the govern-
ment’s power to control noncitizens’ entry into and residence within
the United States. Could it truly be, as the Supreme Court had once
said in the infamous “Chinese Exclusion Case,” that government policies
in this realm are “conclusive upon the judiciary?”1 What conse-
quences might ºow to us all if we accepted the proposition that the
power of the government to “deport foreigners . . . is as absolute and
unqualiªed as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into
the country”?2
On September 11, 2001 we had suspended discussion of these
deep legal and policy concerns for a special session on legal research
techniques. We had set up an internet connection, and its transmis-
sions were projected onto a large screen. I walked into the classroom,
completely oblivious to what had happened that morning, and was
confronted by the stunned and horriªed faces of the early arrivals as
they watched CNN. Then, huddled together, about a hundred of us
watched: students, staff, and faculty. At ªrst, our fears were rather spe-
ciªc and personal—we believed that as many as ªfteen of our students
were on those planes, ºying from Boston to California for job inter-
views. I recall nervously scanning the empty seats in the room. Who
was missing? Who had told me of a trip to California? Many of us be-
gan to worry about friends and family as well. I thought that my
brother was probably near, if not in the heart of, the disaster—he
worked very close to the World Trade Center. (I later learned that,
amazingly, he had overslept that day and awoke in Brooklyn to see
smoke rising over lower Manhattan.) Soon, however, we all realized
that we were witnessing something much bigger than we had initially
thought. The world, it seemed, had suddenly changed in ways that the
mind and the heart struggled to grasp.
I remember standing before this group as the events unfolded,
feeling compelled to say something—to try to sum up, or at least to
frame somehow, what we were witnessing. I knew I was inadequate to
the task, but nevertheless it was mine. The ªrst thought that occurred
to me has stayed with me ever since. I saw ªreªghters and police rush-
ing into that huge inferno; medical emergency teams doing whatever
they could; stunned government ofªcials struggling to do something
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useful—all were uncertain of what they faced, and all were terriªed,
shocked, confused—but all were doing their jobs. I said to my students
that for us—lawyers, law students, especially those who devote our
lives to human rights and the rule of law—our time would come soon
to do the same thing. We would have to rush into a new, uncertain,
complex, potentially dangerous situation and we would have to do our
job.
That job, most simply put, is to construct a system, a discourse,
and a legitimate set of procedures to protect more than a thousand
years of legal culture and human rights, while not, as the Supreme
Court once put it, turning the Constitution into “a suicide pact.”3
It has become apparent that this job requires serious rethinking
of various categories and legal lines. Before September 11, 2001, some
legal categories were fairly unambiguous. U.S. citizens, for example,
unquestionably had powerful procedural and substantive rights
against executive detention. With the rare and controversial excep-
tion of the detention of citizens during declared wars, one could have
conªdently said that the constitutionalized criminal justice system was
the primary framework for analysis of such arrests and detentions.4 As
the Supreme Court put it nearly half a century ago,
[W]e reject the idea that when the United States acts against
citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The
United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its
power and authority have no other source. It can only act in
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitu-
tion. When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen
who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other
parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and lib-
erty should not be stripped away just because he happens to
be in another land.5
As to noncitizens, however, the rules have long been more com-
plicated. After all, the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which author-
ized the President to designate noncitizens for arrest, detention and
removal without judicial process or oversight—were never tested at
the Supreme Court. But it is also well-established that, if subjected to
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formal criminal process, noncitizens retain the same rights as citizens
in that process.6 If, however, they are placed in deportation proceed-
ings—possibly implicating arrest, detention, and the most severe and
harsh of consequences—their rights are substantially diminished and
subject to the ºexible vicissitudes of procedural due process analysis.
Moreover, if they happen to face U.S. government action outside the
United States, the Supreme Court has deemed them to have essen-
tially no constitutional rights at all.7 All this was, of course, doubly
true for so-called “enemy aliens” in times of war.8
So, as a general matter, one could conceptualize the pre-
September 11th rule of executive detention/enforcement law as a
matrix with four major interlocking dichotomies, composed of eight
basic variables, and creating a rough continuum of rights:
peace-time/declared war
inside territory/outside territory
citizen/non-citizen
criminal process/civil process
more secure rights→ more tenuous rights
Although a far from perfect set of distinctions (and the relative
weight of various factors always raised conceptual problems),9 it
seemed a relatively stable one. The legal fallout from September 11,
however, has necessitated serious rethinking of these lines and cate-
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gories.10 At least ªve current trends are discernible, some of which
precede 9/11, but all of which have accelerated since:
1. the use of the immigration control system for security and
other government purposes that do not relate directly to
immigration policy;11
2. the convergence of the criminal justice and immigration
control systems;12
3. the breakdown of the peace/declared war dichotomy in the
amorphous “war on terror”;
4. the placement of great pressure on the legitimacy of the ter-
ritorial line in situations ranging from humanitarian inter-
vention to Iraq and detentions at Guantanamo Bay; and
5. the assertion of executive power against U.S. citizens such as
Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi in ways that call many basic
rights-claims into question.
In March of 2004, a group of leading scholars gathered at Boston
College Law School to consider these and related questions. An im-
pressive range of expertise was in attendance: from U.S. constitu-
tional, immigration, and criminal law, to international human rights
law and the developing law of the European Union. Presenters were
invited to  explore speciªc themes ªtting within the broad rubric I
have just sketched. Our hope was that through such detailed thought
and research, we would begin to see and understand the most recent
evolution of the rule of law—particularly across lines and categories.
The conference yielded remarkable and exciting results.
Throughout the day, participants responded to this basic hypothesis:
that these entrenched historical matrices, these formal lines, are in-
creasingly inadequate to address the complex issues raised by many
current government practices in the campaign known as the “war on
terror.”
If that is correct, then what? I would advocate for less status-based
categorization and a more basic human rights approach. This doc-
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trinal method, of course, could be constructively combined with seri-
ous attention to structural constitutional analysis, as it was by the Sec-
ond Circuit in its Padilla decision.13 But such structural analysis must
also be informed by human rights discourse,14 speciªcally by a robust
version of habeas corpus review that does not rely reºexively on dis-
tinctions such as that between law and discretion or that accepts a
standard of review so deferential as to be functionally meaningless.
Other participants provided what amounts to a menu for future
analysis of a vast array of fundamental issues that our legal system
must reconcile in the years to come.
“Democracies,” it has been said, “die behind closed doors.”15
Thus, the article authored by Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea ad-
dresses a problem notable both for its complexity and high stakes.
What exactly does the public have a “right to know” about the details
of the war on terror? She notes the government’s use of an array of
“nontraditional methods” (a gentler term than I might have chosen)
to “detain, process, and prosecute” individuals suspected of terrorist
activities. And how relevant, if at all, is it that the administration has fo-
cused so zealously on noncitizens? Should we be reassured or alarmed
by courts’ general deference to the Executive’s rather amorphous na-
tional security claims ?
Professor Papandrea wisely counsels courts to recall the interests in
effective self-government that motivated the 1966 passage of the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) and the judicial recognition of the
First Amendment right of access in 1980.16 (To this I might add the
symbolic point that the two dates frame the year of Watergate perfectly,
seven years on each end.) In a wide-ranging and meticulous analysis,
her contribution notes how the public’s knowledge of the Guantanamo
detainees and “enemy combatants” has been both “one-sided” and
“woefully inadequate to scrutinize government actions.”17 This is un-
surprising if one recalls, as does Professor Papandrea, that the political
process has historically been “impotent and incapable of forcing disclo-
sures of information the government prefers to keep secret.”18
                                                                                                                     
13 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
14 See Daniel Kanstroom, Brief for Amici Curiae Law Professors, Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-2235(L), 03-2438(CON.)).
15 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
16 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public’s Right to Know and the War on Terror,
25 B.C. Third World L.J. 35, 36 (2005).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 37.
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But information is only one element of the question of where to
draw such vital legal lines. How closely should courts scrutinize the
myriad of choices made by a government ostensibly pursuing its most
important goal of basic national security? Here, articles by Professors
Stephen Legomsky, Nancy Morawetz, and Theresa Miller are instruc-
tive. Professor Legomsky considers one extraordinarily controversial
subject confronted in the “war on terror”: the legitimacy of ethnic and
religious proªling. He focuses particularly on how proªling affects
noncitizens, an undertaking complicated by the need to consider the
citizen/noncitizen line, as well as to resolve more general questions of
deference to the government in national security matters. His keen
analysis of this problem begins with a useful deªnition of proªling:
“speciªcally targeting individuals who possess identiªable attributes
that are believed to bear positive statistical correlations to particular
kinds of misconduct.”19 As Professor Legomsky notes, this deªnition
may sound innocuous, but post 9/11 proªling has been used quite
strenuously against one particular group: “people who appear to law
enforcement ofªcials to be of Arab descent or Muslim (or both.).” He
details many of these practices as applied to noncitizens, ranging from
intelligence-gathering and “voluntary interviews,” to detention, closed
hearings and visa controls.20 The question thus arises whether such
practices are either sensible or legal. As to the former, Professor Le-
gomsky is dubious, but judicious. He asserts that law enforcement
proªling is justiªable only “when two conditions are met.” First the
practice must be “rational.” And second, “any gains in the efªcacy or
efªciency of the inspection process must be balanced against the sub-
stantial harm of government-sponsored discrimination.”21 Professor
Legomsky concludes that, although the rationality of such practices is
contestable, “the more convincing arguments . . . are those that rec-
ognize that ‘rational’ does not mean ‘justiªable.’”22 He then meticu-
lously considers the harms that ºow from government-sponsored dis-
crimination of this type.
Finally, he addresses a broader concern: the relationship between
this practice and the requirements of international human rights law,
particularly the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
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Discrimination (the “Race Convention”).23 This convention, ratiªed
by the United States in 1994 (albeit with substantial reservations, un-
derstandings, and declarations) “reºects the world’s shared under-
standings that racial discrimination is wrong and that collective inter-
national efforts to eradicate it are essential.”24 As Professor Legomsky
notes, the focus of many government actions on noncitizens raises
special problems in this setting. Despite this, he nevertheless con-
cludes that the citizen/noncitizen line is not a perfect nor a bright
one, and that it is quite possible that some of the U.S. intelligence-
gathering strategies are “potentially vulnerable” to challenges under
the Race Convention.25
The connection between Professor Legomsky’s analysis and the
work of Professors Nancy Morawetz and Teresa Miller is intriguing.
Initially, little seems more arcane than the habeas corpus jurisprudence
of the Federal District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
And yet, Professor Morawetz demonstrates powerfully how this doc-
trinal black hole has tremendous signiªcance to the thousands of
noncitizens whose cases—and persons—are transferred to the remote
Oakdale Federal Detention Facility. Indeed, the issue of detention site
selection proved critical to the Supreme Court’s disposition of the
case of U.S. citizen Jose Padilla.26 The Court’s “seemingly technical
ruling,” that Padilla’s lawyers had incorrectly ªled a habeas petition in
New York instead of South Carolina where he was held, is actually of
“enormous importance,” asserts Professor Morawetz.27 In a fascinating
and meticulous study of the rather bizarre practices of the Louisiana
court in cases involving noncitizens, Professor Morawetz artfully tran-
scends the citizen/noncitizen line and highlights “the grave dangers
of extending the rule of Padilla beyond that case and into any situa-
tion in which the government has the power to choose the situs of
detention.”28 Perhaps most signiªcantly for purposes of future litiga-
tion, she emphasizes that the locus of habeas actions is an issue unre-
lated to subject matter jurisdiction, and the standard should be “re-
laxed where it would reward abuse by the government or otherwise
                                                                                                                     
23 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.)
24 Legomsky, supra note 19, at 186.
25 Id. at 196.
26 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004.)
27 Nancy Morawetz, Detention Decisions and Access to Habeas Corpus for Immigrants Facing
Deportation, 25 B.C. Third World L.J. 13, 14 (2005).
28 Id. at 15.
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fail to provide fair access to the writ.”29 Otherwise, the power that has
developed in immigration cases—the power to “move noncitizens to a
law-free zone”—could extend much further.30 Ultimately, as Professor
Morawetz points out, the experience of the noncitizens in Oakdale
should “serve as a sober reminder of the degree to which substantive
protection from illegal government action depends not just on sub-
stantive judicial rulings, but also on . . . procedural rules that will de-
termine whether courts ever reach the merits of a case . . . .”31 Little in
our post 9/11 jobs as legal professionals could be of greater import.
Professor Teresa Miller examines the doctrinal line between
criminal punishment and immigration law. She notes the powerful
convergence of “get tough” policies in the criminal justice realm, the
1996 changes to U.S. immigration, and the post-September 11 re-
gime. This connection—one to which I have devoted much attention
as well—leads to the recognition that “the interaction of the two sys-
tems produced outcomes that were unprecedented, and even unin-
tentional at times, in their harshness.”32 Professor Miller moves from
this point to examine three major theoretical responses to the con-
vergence between immigration and criminal law and ªnally to a most
fruitful discussion of how “the new penology” blurs historical distinc-
tions among “illegal aliens,” “criminal aliens” and “terrorists.”33 Her
wide-ranging article closes with a series of questions, perhaps the most
poignant of which is: “To what extent is the nation made more secure
when its alien population is subject to harsh, criminally punitive sanc-
tions for relatively minor criminal or immigration transgressions?”34
As she notes with understatement, the bare contours of these ques-
tions are yet undeªned, let alone any clear answers to them.
Noncitizens in Oakdale face a court that, according to Professor
Morawetz, “views itself as largely without power.”35 Historically, the
territorial line has served as a classic justiªcation for this phenome-
non of impotence, a fact undoubtedly informing the government’s
decision to detain noncitizens at the U.S. naval bases at Guantanamo
                                                                                                                     
29 Id.
30 Id. at 17. This is not to say that this power is not already a serious problem in its own
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adjudication of their cases. Id. at 30.
31 Id. at 33.
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tember 11th, 25 B.C. Third World L.J. 81, 83 (2005).
33 Id. at 86.
34 Id. at 123.
35 Morawetz, supra note 27, at 33.
10 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:1
instead of, say, lower Manhattan. Professor David Martin, a leading
scholar of both immigration and human rights law, considers the nu-
merous issues raised by the case of Rasul v. Bush,36 which held that
U.S. courts have jurisdiction over habeas claims from Guantanamo.
Using aspects of the companion case to Rasul, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,37
Professor Martin assumes the complicated task of sketching out a
speciªc method for the consideration of future challenges to deten-
tion in similar settings. In so doing, he does not rely on prior ªxed
categories such as citizenship or territory, but carefully considers in-
stead the aspects of rights, pragmatism, and judicial legitimacy impli-
cated by various approaches. He describes his essay as “an effort to
bolster an emerging and workable middle ground.”38 Although he
concedes that his suggested method—in which primary factªnding
would be done by military tribunals—might “disappoint some,” Pro-
fessor Martin notes that it offers several rather powerful and un-
derappreciated advantages, of which the most signiªcant is possibly
the enhancement of judicial review to consider de novo the validity of
tribunal procedures and even the substantive standards for who is “an
enemy combatant.”39
Professor Martin begins with a careful consideration of the previ-
ous dominant precedent in the ªeld, the Court’s 1950 decision in John-
son v. Eisentrager.40 He artfully analyzes Rasul v. Bush 41 and draws on
“signals” from Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 42 to “use the judicial instrument care-
fully and cleverly, in order to maximize the chances that persons
wrongfully detained can secure prompt release—while still allowing
amply for the real demands of military efficacy.”43 His focus on Part IV
of Justice Jackson’s opinion in Eisentrager cleverly blends aspects of the
three cases’ reasoning into one coherent theoretical whole. Among the
most impressive features of Professor Martin’s work is his comprehen-
sive analysis of military/government/security concerns as well as the
protection of human rights. After disaggregating the various rights
claims that have been made, he appraises the role of courts in each
                                                                                                                     
36 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
37 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
38 David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The Un-
derappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. Third World L.J. 125, 127 (2005).
39 Id.
40 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
41 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686.
42 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633.
43 Martin, supra note 38, at 136.
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domain.44 His conclusions are, he acknowledges, paradoxical. By means
of analogies from immigration law, he suggests—contrary to the stance
of most human rights advocates—that deferential standards of review
“give rise to a salutary form of acoustic separation that actually bolsters
a delicate but indispensable balance when the strongest of governmen-
tal needs conºicts with the most elemental of individual liberty
claims.”45 Whether one agrees with this ultimate conclusion or not, Pro-
fessor Martin has crafted a most impressive recipe for future food for
thought.
As we grapple with the complexities of the questions posed by each
of these ªne essays, we might do well to look beyond the United States
for useful approaches to similar problems. French professor of law,
Sophie Robin-Olivier, thus considers the operation of the citi-
zen/noncitizen line in the European Union’s counterterrorism efforts.
Though noting that “the situation of immigrants on both sides of the
Atlantic has generally deteriorated,” Professor Robin-Olivier concludes
that the lives of noncitizens in Europe have not changed as dramatically
as have those of noncitizens in the nation of immigrants.46 To account
for this divergence, she identiªes the shared competence of the EU
and its constituent Member States over both the ªght against terrorism
and immigration policies. Although European measures “ostensibly
designed to ªght terrorism . . . have pointedly targeted noncitizens,”47
Professor Robin-Olivier writes that aspects of the EU legal system, espe-
cially its robust and speciªc protections of human rights, may “limit or
counterbalance the impact of anti-terrorism measures on nonciti-
zens.”48 Such protections include measures that go far beyond the
rights system existing in the United States, including, for example, ac-
ceptance of the legal argument that the “decision to expel . . .” may
constitute an “interference with the right to respect for family life” re-
quired by European human rights law.49 Professor Robin-Olivier also
notes a report issued by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe that concluded that U.S. practices at Guantanamo Bay would
not pass muster under European standards.50 Moreover, she considers
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47 Id. at 199.
48 Id. at 200.
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the weight given in Europe to the principle of “nondiscrimination.”
She strikes her most optimistic note in the ªnal section of her essay,
which considers the emerging idea of European citizenship and reºects
on the potential for its universalist aspirations to broaden acceptance of
principles of equality and fundamental rights.
Hannah Arendt once described the period immediately preced-
ing the Second World War as a time when, “the very phrase ‘human
rights’ became for all concerned—victims, persecutors, and onlookers
alike—the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded
hypocrisy.”51 The meticulous care taken by the authors of these essays,
and by other presenters and attendees of this symposium, offers pow-
erful support for a more optimistic view in this era.
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